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Abstract
Purpose GNSS is penetrating, surely but certainly, the
railway market. Introduction is performed through non
safety oriented applications such as fleet management or
passenger information. However, a huge panel of safety
applications could take advantage of this technology.
Galileo will soon complement the navigation satellite offer,
monopolized today by GPS. Some issues have to be studied
before safety uses: performance requirements have to be
expressed; cost benefit analysis has to prove advantages
compared to installed equipment... But one of the main
issues concerns safety proofs that have to be in accordance
with European railway standards.
Methods Today, Galileo is not yet deployed but specifica-
tions are available. However, such specifications have been
mainly driven by aeronautics. This paper deals with the
question of the RAMS evaluation of the satellite-based
location function delivered to a railway safety application,
as recommended by railway standards and presents a
methodology to transpose GNSS specifications into RAMS.
Results It explains each definition of performance and
demonstrates the relations between the Galileo SoL per-
formances and the railway RAMS attributes.
Conclusions GNSS are a powerful tool to enhance railway
efficiency when its adequacy with railway specifications
will be proved. This paper is a contribution to this effort.
Keywords Satellite-based localization . Railway
transportation system . RAMS analysis
1 Introduction
Contrary to what the general public may think, railways are
part of the technological race of transportation systems. In
particular, if Galileo has been essentially driven by
aeronautical actors, railways demonstrate their interest for
this localization technology. Some applications are already
ongoing. They rely for the moment on GPS (American),
which is the only fully operational system, while Galileo
(European) is under development and Glonass (Russian)
under renewal. Most of them are non-safety-related, such as
passenger information or cargo management. However, in
the US, where the railway network differs strongly from the
European one, some control and command systems are now
based on GPS, enhanced by the NDGPS (Nationwide
Differential GPS), which is a network of reference stations
allowing the receiver to have better performances.
In Europe, developments on the operational network
have been slow but, for a few years, European projects like
LOCOPROL or GADEROS have highlighted the potential
of GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) for more
constraining applications like safety-related applications.
However, some major issues remain, in particular, whether
or not performances provided by GNSS services can meet
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railway safety requirements. Recent confirmation of the good
progress of the Galileo program encourages research teams and
the railway industry to pursue their efforts in this direction.
In this paper, we will present both the Galileo offer and
railway issues. The main question deals with certification of
GNSS solutions for safety-related applications. For this
task, railway standards have to prove that, even in case of
failures, the system studied is able to guarantee a given
level of performances expressed in the railway domain in
terms of RAMS attributes (Reliability, Availability, Main-
tainability and Safety). The next section will analyse the
specific errors related to GNSS to show when failures of the
positioning service can occur and degrade performances.
Finally, the last section gives elements to realize safety
assessment and evaluate the RAMS, the results of these two
tasks being beyond the scope of this paper. In this section, it
is explained how the specifications of the navigation
services can be used for conducting such evaluations,
especially the Galileo quality criteria that are defined in
Galileo specifications.
2 Using Galileo for railway operations
Most of the Galileo specifications are defined in (ESA
2002), in terms of services and technical requirements. The
goal of this paragraph is to face both Galileo services and
railway needs in order to highlight the potential benefits of
using GNSS for such transport mode. The first paragraph
will recall Galileo services and signals. Then, railway
requirements will be summarized even if specifications
vary strongly according to the application. Finally, issues
will be highlighted and some answers will be given when
describing some of the research projects in progress.
2.1 The Galileo services
In the common language, a GNSS receiver is today called
“a GPS” due to the monopoly of GPS, the only fully
operational constellation available today. This constellation,
managed by the American Department of Defense (DoD),
provides a permanent four-dimensional positioning service
(longitude, latitude, height and time) under all weather
conditions and in all places.
In the near future, GPS will cohabit with other constella-
tions. Indeed, the Russian Space Agency intends to expand the
GLONASS constellation from the current 19 satellites to 30 by
2011. A Chinese competitor called BEIDOU or COMPASS is
also believed to be under development. In 2008, BEIDOU is
composed of geostationary satellites devoted to augment GPS
performances, as EGNOS does in Europe or WAAS in the
USA, but, officially, a global competitor system is announced
in the coming years.
For economic, societal, political, as well as technolog-
ical, issues, Europe decided in the 1990s to develop its own
satellite navigation system, called Galileo. This upcoming
localization system will provide five different services with
different performances and characteristics that will be
suitable for different ranges of applications:
– TheGalileo Open Service (OS), which will be the elemen-
tary service (similar to the SPS service of the GPS).
– The Safety of Life service (SoL), which will provide a
guarantee of integrity.
– With the Commercial service (CS) and for a fee, users
will benefit from two additional signals to improve
accuracy.
– The public regulated Service (PRS) will provide a
continuous availability of the signals in the presence of
interfering threats. It is especially dedicated to govern-
mental applications.
– The Search and Rescue service (SAR) will be a
contribution to the existing COSPAS/SARSAT for
emergency distress messages detection.
GPS and Galileo systems will be interoperable. Com-
patible receivers will therefore benefit from greater service
volume, availability and accuracy.
The Open Service will have close characteristics with the
public service of GPS. Using integrity added-values, the
SoL service will give guarantees for safety applications and
is the most able to convince railway users (the paragraph
3.2 of this article explains in details integrity concepts).
After this brief Galileo presentation, railway issues will
be described in order to identify convergences.
2.2 Current railway needs
The objective of this paragraph is to present the reasons for
making GNSS penetrate the railway systems. These reasons
mainly emanate from the localization constraints the
railway users are faced with.
The first reason is cost-driven as shown in these three
situations:
– New technologies make possible the introduction of
intelligent and communicating trains and wagons on
the railway network. The new services offered enhance
attractivity and impose a strong competitive position.
This can considerably improve service quality by
informing and localising wagons and corresponding
materials or to verify available equipment etc.
– With separation of infrastructures and operation,
railway users pay the infrastructure owner for the
circulation of trains and energy consumption. GNSS-
based positioning information contributes to energy
tolling for developing an adapted toll for railways.
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– High costs relative to the installation of signalling
equipment on track and their maintenance are not
compensated for traffic revenues, especially in the case
of low traffic density lines. This is critical because
some of the European networks are threatened with
closure for economic reasons. We can mention as an
example, the German case where more than 5,000 km
of lines have been closed in the past 16 years, i.e. 10%.
Even if the investment costs will not be negligible to
equip each locomotive with GNSS receivers, the
maintenance costs are expected to be much lower.
The second reason is technological. Historically and
technically, each country has developed its own railway
networks. The consequences are that the amount of equipment
is as large as the number of countries. This is the case for
infrastructure, energy (electrification at 25, 15, 3 and 1.5 KV,
+ 750 V), rolling stock, maintenance and exploitation rules, as
well as signalling systems. Now that trains are running over
borders, Europe has developed a system called ERTMS to
harmonize equipment and signalling rules. The possibility of
using GNSS is envisaged in ERTMS level 3 scenario for
ensuring localization functions of the ERTMS/ETCS signal-
ling system. GNSS are global systems that will not only
contribute to answer interoperability needs but also to increase
capacity of lines. Indeed, GNSS will permit trains to localize
autonomously and with ERTMS/ETCS, positions obtained on
board trains can be transmitted to the ground via GSM-R. This
will optimize traffic because intervals between trains will be
dynamically determined using moving block principle instead
of fixed blocks. Modifying the signalling system that controls
train traffic will have an impact on the following safety
functions, which rely on this system and which are based on
localization:
– Controlling that no train exceeds its own speed limit
nor the different speed limits assigned to the various
track sections,
– Controlling that each train proceeds in the correct
direction and remains within a limited authorized zone,
called the movement authority,
– Controlling that each train is assigned a zone and each
zone contains one and only one train,
– Controlling that each train's movement authority is
correctly established, meaning i) that sufficient protec-
tions have been set to forbid the entrance of other trains
into a zone that has been assigned to a specific train,
and ii) that the points of the different switches are
blocked in the correct position so that the train moves
along its planned itinerary (with signalling and inter-
locking equipment),
– for railway transportation systems that interact with
road traffic, controlling that each level-crossing train
barrier is in the correct position to protect people and
vehicles during the passage of the train, and,
– Verifying that no object or person is on the track in
front of the train.
In the case of technology migration with GNSS-based
equipment, all these safety functions have to be performed
following high safety requirements. Equipment has also to
be designed according to the principles of functional and
technical safety described in European railway standards
[3, 4]. In these standards, SILs (Safety Integrity Levels)
serve as safety targets. They are discrete indicators on a
four-level scale. On this scale, SIL 1 is the weakest safety
requirement and SIL 4 is the most restrictive. Signalling
functions have mostly to be proved to meet a SIL 4 level.
For the moment, GNSS-based standalone solutions, i.e. not
enhanced with other sensors, are not developed under
safety principles, as is the case for transmission systems
mentioned in the 50159 standard [5]. SIL 0 is used to
characterize such systems with no safety requirements.
The following paragraphs explain why it is difficult to
certify GNSS-based solutions for railway safety-related
applications. Before the different solutions that have been
explored by the railway community will be described.
2.3 European research answers
Before describing some of this research, one should highlight
that, contrary to aeronautical or maritime domains, railways
do not have common rules and therefore, common require-
ments. If the UIC’s (International Union of Railways) role is to
facilitate the sharing of best practices amongmembers, there is
no equivalent to ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation) or IMO (International Maritime Organisation). Such
organizations have defined precise technical requirements for
most of their function. In the railway community, there is no
specifications table shared by the entire community, in
particular for the localisation function. Each of the following
projects has brought its own requirements.
Some of years ago, the European Commission started to
support research on GNSS in railway transportations. With
the idea of preparing the arrival of Galileo, the first
objective of projects was to experiment and prove that
satellites could offer new services to railway users, based
on the existing GPS constellation.
APOLO, LOCOPROL or GADEROS were pioneering
projects in Europe. They have explored different GNSS-
based solutions with different constraints. The three
projects intended to comply with ERTMS/ETCS deploy-
ments. However, GADEROS has developed a multisensor
solution based on Galileo SoL signals.
In LOCOPROL, a low cost GPS-only based solution
was developed, which was aided by EGNOS when
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available along tracks. In this solution, as GPS does not
offer any service guarantee, the chosen solution (patented
by Alstom) relies, not on a typical GNSS computation, but
on the use of independent pairs of GPS signals, in order to
reach a required safety target [13]. Thus, a TDOA (Time
Difference of Arrival) technique has been applied [12]. The
performances of the LOCOPROL positioning algorithm
have been studied in the LOCOLOC project [11]. Fault
trees taking into account classical GNSS measurement
errors but also signal perturbations and trainborne equip-
ment, have shown that positions, obtained with the 1D
hyperbolic algorithm, met a SIL 4 objective (probability of
failure lower than 10-11/h).
The EGNOS COntrolled RAILway equipment (ECO-
RAIL) project, finished in 2005, focused on accuracy. Indeed,
it aimed at providing an on-board unit that was able to
determine the position of a train on the track with sufficient
accuracy and reliability to be used for railway control
purposes.
The GRAIL consortium funded by the 6th Framework
Program attempted to achieve common specifications
(agreed by users and industry) for the GNSS subsystem
dedicated to the odometry function [10]. The objective was
to examine how GNSS can complement an odometry
system.
New issues appeared during these projects: standardiza-
tion of interfaces and specifications, and mainly, the
difficulty of proving safety for GNSS-based solutions for
certification.
2.4 Issues related to RAMS evaluation, safety proofs
and certification
With the integrity added-value delivered by the Galileo SoL
service, more possibilities will be provided to the safety-
related GNSS-based applications, especially the possibility
to detect positioning failures when biases occur in signals.
But problems provoked by reception environment are not
resolved.
Furthermore, Galileo specifications have been essentially
driven by aeronautic users (cf. paragraph 3.3). They have
no equivalent in the railway domain where definitions of
specifications are different and expressed in terms of
RAMS.
Another issue concerns certification. Indeed, as railway
equipment has to be certified by a notified body before being
installed on tracks or embedded into trains, GNSS infra-
structures will also have to be certified as well as the receivers
based on its services. One main difference is that GNSS is not
at all under railway control. A certification process is ongoing
at the European level. The GALCERT program has been
funded to support it, taking into account the diversity of
the different transport modes. Its role is to ensure that the
components of the system are certified, and, in particular
the SIS (Signals In Space). One of the railway tasks is to
take part in it in order to understand and accept it [1].
Before closing this paragraph, one should also mention
the acceptance issue. Indeed, migration from track-circuit
technology, providing discrete positioning, to GNSS tech-
nology, providing continuous positioning, represents a big
break. Instead of controlling the complete equipment,
GNSS will constrain the railway community to be confident
in a completely external process... This will remain an
important point in the coming years. Such issues will rely
on the capacity of projects and first demonstrators to
convince, i.e. to prove that the system will be as good, safe,
cheap, and reliable as the previous ones.
Thus, several tasks are fundamental:
– define GNSS performances into an acceptable railway
language,
– develop methods and tools able to perform evaluation
in an operational railway context. Experimental sol-
utions are in progress [14],
– evaluate RAMS of the trainborne GNSS solution
according to railway safety standards.
The third section of this article describes how to perform
a RAMS analysis for solutions based on Galileo (the third
point). To conduct such an analysis, the specifications
defined in Galileo documentation are examined and their
equivalence with railway specifications is explained (the
first point).
3 About RAMS analysis on a Galileo-based solution
3.1 RAMS analysis of GNSS-based equipment under
design
Before including new equipment or functions in a railway
safety-related system, the RAMS attributes of these
equipment or functions need to be quantified at the design
level of the life cycle, as demanded in the EN 50126
standard [3]. The objective is to measure the confidence
that can be placed in the new system, especially when it is
dedicated to safety operations. A RAMS analysis examines
firstly all known failure causes and failure modes of the
system (possible failure states of the system) by means of
dependability methods like the fault tree method, FMECA
(Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis), reliability
block diagram... Particular attention is paid to the different
failure combinations that can lead to the failure of the
studied system or the loss of the final output. The analysis
can then use the failure rates and the logical combination of
each part of the system to achieve the RAMS attributes
evaluation.
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The system studied, in this article, is the satellite-based
positioning solution using the Galileo SoL service and
performed by equipment that could be integrated in a
railway signalling system. If the quantification of the
RAMS attributes of the positioning function shows that
the railway positioning requirements are not fulfilled, the
Galileo SoL service cannot be the only means of localiza-
tion in the railway safety application. We explain below
why the RAMS analysis realized on a satellite-based
positioning function is special compared to classical
analyses.
3.2 Particularities of the RAMS analysis
3.2.1 Failure cause analysis of the positioning function
The function that will provide position for railway applica-
tions is here analysed to show how it can fail. A failure occurs
when the difference between the position calculated by the
user and its true position is greater than a threshold defined in
the application. As the receivers are not able to calculate this
error, it remains unknown for the user.
The position failure is a feared event for the user, i.e. an
hazard for the safety-related railway application. It may
result from software or hardware failures that occur in any
of the three GNSS segments (ground control, satellite and
user segments). It can also be the result of specific causes
that are not common in RAMS evaluation methods [2]:
errors that affect satellite signals (or SIS). We classify these
errors in two categories:
– Errors due to perturbations in signal propagation.
Indeed, pseudo-ranges (estimation of the satellites/
receiver distances by the receiver) used to calculate a
position rely on propagation time measurements. As
seen in the second section, the close environment of the
receiver has an impact on signal propagation. It induces
delays and multipath that can degrade the measurement
of pseudo-ranges.
– Errors in signal data (navigation message). These data
(ephemeris, satellite clock correction), used for satellite
location can be corrupted.
Thus, additionally to the common software and
hardware failures present in ground, satellite and
receiver equipment, the RAMS evaluation has to
consider the specific errors that are present in signals
and that lead to a position outside the user accuracy
requirements (a position failure).
Later on in this article, software and hardware failures
will be supposed to be controlled by operators in charge of
the different respective infrastructures. Indeed, as men-
tioned in paragraph 2.4, GNSS infrastructures are not under
railway control. Thus, we focus on the main research issue:
the RAMS evaluation given SIS errors and existing GNSS
specifications.
3.2.2 Diagnostic mechanism to detect a position failure
Within the Galileo SoL service, each SIS will be associated
to an integrity message. With this message, receivers will
be able to detect a position failure. However, the entire
diagnostic mechanism of the Galileo system (diagnostic
algorithm in receiver, integrity data in the navigation
message, monitoring at ground segment level) is not fault-
free, given the following causes:
– at user level, the receivers can use a failing signal
(which includes data noise or bias) in the position
computation without detecting it;
– integrity data can be corrupted through degraded uplink
between ground and satellite segments;
– integrity data can be incorrect through independent and
common cause failures stemming from the monitoring
system at the ground segment.
Therefore, diagnostic failures must also be taken into
account in the global analysis.
Consequently, we distinguish two generic cause events
leading to position failure:
– Integrity events: these events occur when a failure
exists and has not been detected by the diagnostic
mechanism,
– Continuity events: these events occur when the
positioning function is interrupted because of signal
generation and propagation problems, poor receiver-
user geometry, etc. It includes events that have been
detected by the diagnostic mechanism.
Accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability concepts are
in fact the quality criteria commonly used for describing the
performances provided by a GNSS. Expected performances
of on-board Galileo-based equipment have been defined in the
Galileo specification documents [6]. They can be used to
describe the RAMS attributes associated to the Galileo
positioning function. We explain below how this is done. We
will show why the analogy between the two classes of
quality criteria is not immediate but possible. It requires the
background of the GNSS quality criteria to be explained.
This will be presented in the last section of this article with a
methodology to prove the analogy.
3.3 Why are Galileo performance requirements different
from RAMS objectives but also analogous?
The specifications of the Galileo SoL service in terms of
accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability are presented
in Table 1. No equivalent specifications are defined in
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railway domain to characterise what users expect from
localization, so no comparison is possible.
Table 1 shows the three categories of requirements that
have been identified according to the needs set forth by
different applications. They especially cover the diverse
safety constraints the users’ community meet [7]. In
the case of the railway community, the needs for safety
applications are expected to be covered by the level
associated to the more constrained requirements: level A.
However, these requirements have mainly been proposed
to support aeronautical operations (ranging from en-route
phase to approach operation with vertical guidance, called
APV II). In fact, continuity requirements were introduced
for the first time in aviation in the late 1960s to define
precise approach requirements for a radio navigation
system, called the Instrument Landing System (ILS). The
purpose was to describe the quality of service during a most
critical phase of operation (e.g. 15 s for the precise
approach phase of an aeroplane before landing, duration
in which service interruption is dangerous). Continuity
requirement was derived by means of a risk allocation from
the Target Level of Safety (TLS), whereas TLS results from
statistical analysis of historical accident data of aeroplanes
for a given period. In 1993, the ICAO’s Air Navigation
Commission requested All Weather Operations Panel
(AWOP) to examine the possibility of extending the
Required Navigation Performance (RNP) concept, which
was originally intended for en-route operations, to include
approach, landing and departure operations. At that time,
it was proposed to use the accuracy, integrity, continuity,
and availability quality criteria that were later retained for
GNSS.
As GNSS requirements are driven by aeronautical needs,
the railway community encounters difficulties to adapt
them for train positioning purposes. For example, no phases
of operation can be distinguished when trains are running;
requirements are only defined at the sub-system or function
level. In safety applications, as mentioned previously,
requirements are expressed differently using RAMS attrib-
utes and a process for their specification and demonstration
is exposed in CENELEC standards [3, 4]. So, the safety
philosophies in railway and aeronautical domains are
different and the quality criteria are not interchangeable,
considering they are not defined with the same objective.
In spite of this, a mutual relation among Galileo quality
criteria and RAMS attributes exists because both criteria are
associated to probabilities, which show the confidence we
can have in the system, and the risks the system can
generate. Dependences are felt a priori.
The next section presents how to demonstrate the
dependences between the two classes of quality criteria in
order to allocate RAMS objectives to the Galileo-based
positioning receiver. The demonstration is based on
identification of the failure modes of the Galileo output
function and on the probability associated to each of them.
4 Methodology to demonstrate the relation between
the Galileo SoL performances and the railway RAMS
attributes
In this part, GNSS quality criteria will be explicitly linked
up to the reliability and availability attributes of the RAMS
ones. Links existing between these attributes and the
maintainability and safety of GNSS will be presented given
that railway RAMS are inter-linked as it is described in the
EN 50126 standard.
4.1 Failure modes analysis and corresponding probabilities
The position error PE is the difference in meters between
the estimated and exact positions. Users consider that an
estimated position is correct or accurate as long as PE,
which value is variable in time, is maintained within a user
defined alert limit AL, i.e. PE ≤ AL. On the contrary, as
long as a position is such as PE > AL (the duration of this
condition is unpredictable), the safety of the entire
transportation system is degraded.
Some railway requirements have been defined during
Rail Advisory Forum [15]. An extract concerning AL
threshold, especially defined according to the horizontal
component (because train run is considered in 2D), is
illustrated in Table 2. Different types of operating con-







SIS integrity risk 2.0 e-7 in any 150 sec 1.0e-7/ 1 h 1.0e-5/ 3 h
Continuity risk 8.0e-6 in any 15 sec 1.0e-4 to 1.0e-8 / 1 h 3.0e-4 / 3 h
Availability of service 99.5 % 99.5 % 99.5 %
Time to alarm 6 sec 10 sec 10 sec
Accuracy (95%) H / V 4 m / 8 m 220 m / NA 10 m / NA
HAL / VAL* 40 m / 20 m 556 m / NA 25 m / NA
Table 1 Performance require-
ments for the Galileo SoL
service
*Horizontal and vertical alarm
limits
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The following failure modes can then be distinguished
given that a failure detection mechanism is used:
– the safe detected failure modes. Probability PFSD(t)
represents a probability that PE ≤ AL, and that an alert
is raised due to a failure of diagnostics. False alert is
then announced.
– the safe undetected failure modes. Probability PFSU(t)
represents the probability of a non-critical failure when
PE ≤ AL, but no failure is announced by built-in
diagnostics. In this case, a safe failure in the system
exists but the user does not know about it. It can be
revealed by an independent diagnostics based on
physically diverse sensors, but it is beyond the scope
of this paper.
– the dangerous detected failure modes. Probability
PFDD(t) represents the probability that PE exceeds
AL and this state is detected as hazardous. Then, it is a
dangerous detected failure (true alert).
– the dangerous undetected failure modes. Probability
PFDU(t) represents the probability that PE exceeds AL
without detection. This dangerous undetected failure is
the most feared failure of the system.
All possible sequences of failures are represented using
the consequence diagram in Fig. 1.
How the defined probabilities of failure modes are
associated to the Galileo quality criteria probabilities is
detailed below.
4.2 Probability associated to Galileo quality criteria
4.2.1 Integrity quality criterion
The integrity of service is guaranteed when the GNSS
receiver provides correct information. The probability IR(t)
is the measure of integrity risk. It refers to the probability of
the incorrect position due to the failures mentioned in the
cause analysis of section 3. Therefore, the probability of
dangerous undetected failures describes the integrity risk,
i.e. IR(t) = PFDU(t).
4.2.2 Continuity quality criterion
The continuity of service is guaranteed when the GNSS
receiver provides the following during operation: (1)
navigation accuracy and (2) accuracy guarantee (i.e.
integrity) within a stated period of time [0,t]. Probability
C(t) is the measure of continuity. Continuity risk CR(t) is
the complement of C(t), i.e. CR(t) = 1 - C(t). Loss of SIS
continuity described with CR(t) is caused by unscheduled
interruptions due to internal failure in the detection
mechanisms and not by shadowing objects along the track,
which are easily predictable.
Probability to provide a continuous correct position
(PE ≤ AL) refers directly to the reliability R(t) because
the reliability is defined as the probability that an item can
perform a required function under given conditions for a
given time interval [0,t].
A continuous correct position is obviously not provided by
GNSS when a failure is detected and notified. Therefore, prob-
ability PFSD(t) i.e. probability of false alert, and PFDD(t) i.e.
probability of true alert, that are both related to the inter-
ruption of service are such as: CR(t) = PFSD(t) + PFDD(t).
Undetected failure modes, represented by probabilities
PFDU(t) and PFSU(t), exist during position determination
since user does not know them.
Finally, the total probability of continuous provision
of position with acceptable integrity of service is
C(t) = R(t) + PFSU(t) + PFDU(t). C(t) is not only equal
to R(t) as position is also provided when a failure is not

























Fig. 1 Consequences diagram of the Galileo positioning function
Safety-related applications
Operating conditions Examples Horizontal Alert
Limit –HAL
I. High density lines Train control on I / station /
parallel track
2,5 m
II. Middle density lines Train control on II 20 m
III. Low density lines Train control on III 50 m
Table 2 Rail Advisory Forum
requirements on AL
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failures (DU, SU) can be revealed by additional diagnostics
based on physically diverse sensors.
Note that dangerous detected failures (true alert) are not
as dangerous as dangerous undetected failures. They can be
converted to fail-safe state. For example, a train can be
stopped. However, it shall be done only in an extreme case,
if no other possibility exists. Relatively frequent interrup-
tions of Galileo Signal-In-Space SoL Level A Service
(MTBF=521 h) can be substituted by a relative position
determination, by means of sensors [8].
4.2.3 GNSS availability quality criterion
GNSS service is available if the requirements of accuracy,
integrity and continuity of the positioning function are met.
It deals with the correct operation of the service at a given
instant t and at a given location. The availability is,
therefore, time- and space-dependent.
4.3 Positioning performances analogy with the RAMS
requirements
4.3.1 Reliability of the positioning function
The reliability R(t) of the positioning function is a measure
of success on the operation time interval [0,t]. It can be
expressed as R(t) = 1 - (PFD(t) + PFS(t)).
We can define the probability of failing safely:
PFS(t) = PFSD(t) + PFSU(t) that is the probability on the
time interval [0,t] that PE ≤ AL, and the probability of
failing dangerously: PFD(t) = PFDD(t) + PFDU(t) that is the
probability on the time interval [0,t] that PE > AL. Given
IR(t) = PFDU(t), then PFD(t) = PFDD(t) + IR(t).
The unreliability F(t) = 1 - R(t) is a measure of failure
in time interval [0,t]. It represents PE exceeding AL
and/or a diagnostic failure. It can be expressed as
F(t) = PFD(t) + PFS(t). Thus unreliable position is
described by the failure modes which are represented by
probability PFSD(t), PFSU(t), PFDD(t), PFDU(t) on top of the
Venn diagram in Fig. 2. This figure shows the relation
between the failures modes probability of the positioning
function and the GNSS quality criteria. It also shows the
relation between the failures modes and the reliability and
safety attributes.
Note that real systems can stop providing accuracy or
integrity independently. In the case of dangerous detected
failure PFDD(t), accuracy can be lost (PE > AL) while
integrity (timely warning) is provided. Alternatively, in the
case of safe undetected failure PFSU(t), accuracy is
provided (PE ≤ AL) even if the ability to provide timely
warnings is lost. In this case, the user considers that system
integrity is correct since he receives an integrity message
without any warning. Therefore, we can distinguish three
kinds of continuity: (1) Continuity of Accuracy, (2)
Continuity of Integrity of Accuracy, and (1+2) Continuity
of Service. In the case of GNSS safety applications, (1+2)
should be considered [9].
4.3.2 GNSS availability versus quality of signalling system
in terms of the availability and maintainability attributes
According to a RAMS point of view, service is available if
a GNSS system is correctly operating at time t. No
requirement for successful operation at a specific moment
of time is directly involved in GNSS availability. However,
a condition of continuous successful operation within a
specific time interval [0,t] is involved in a lower rung, in
the continuity requirement. A system can also be accurate,
have high integrity and continuity, but it can be down e.g.
1 month per year. maintainability must be assured. When
maintainability is considered together with other quality
criteria, then we talk about availability of continuity,
availability of integrity, etc. GNSS availability at user level
also implies that GNSS receiver is able to predict accuracy,















Fig. 2 Illustration of the analogy between GNSS criteria and the
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CR(t) = PFDD(t) + PFSD(t) A { t | M(t) } ≈ 1 – ( IR(t) + CR(t) )
_
Fig. 3 GNSS quality criteria within railway RAMS
100 Eur. Transp. Res. Rev. (2010) 2:93–102
operation period and the predicted values must not exceed
the specified values.
The availability A(t) according to EN 50126 is a
combination of reliability and maintainability. The safety
attribute is not included in the railway availability even if
both are dependent. In relation to railway safety-related
systems, we usually talk about dependability and safety
distinctly. A(t) depends on correct position determination,
correct function of diagnostics and maintainability M(t) of
GNSS system. It can be written as A{t|M(t)}. Availability
A{t|M(t)} can be evaluated by means of the unavailability,
the probability of incorrect operations U{t|M(t)} under
condition that maintainability M(t) is provided (∀ t, M(t)=1).
Probability of incorrect operations of GNSS system can
be determined from given integrity risk IR(t) = PFDU(t)
and continuity risk CR(t) = PFDD(t) + PFSD(t) as
U{(t|M(t)} = IR(t) + CR(t) = PFDU(t) + PFDD(t) + PFSD(t).
The probability PFSU(t) remains and is considered as being
part of the reliability part R(t) . This simplification can be
done since correct position is provided. Then availability
A{t|M(t)} can be expressed as:
A tjMðtÞf g ¼ 1 PFDðtÞ þ PFSðtÞð Þ
¼ 1 PFDU ðtÞ þ PFDDðtÞ þ PFSDðtÞ þ PFSU ðtÞð Þ
¼ 1 1RðtÞ þ CRðtÞ þ PFSU ðtÞð Þ
 1 1RðtÞ þ CRðtÞð Þ
4.4 Quality attributes of GNSS-based railway signalling
The use of the GNSS quality criteria within railway RAMS
is proposed in Fig. 3. It results from analysis of GNSS
integrity and continuity risks performed above.
In railway safety-related systems, a failure rate per hour
shall be used, instead of a probability per duration of
operation for purpose of a quantitative safety analysis.
Indeed, SIL requirements (cf. paragraph 2.2) are quantita-
tively defined using Tolerable Hazard Rate (THR) and,
also, as mentioned above, no phases of operation can be
distinguished in railway systems. An approach to convert
GNSS integrity risk to THR and so to a SIL has been
proposed in [8].
5 Conclusion and prospects
Up to now, GPS has convinced a lot of users about
feasibility and efficiency of non-safety solutions based on
satellite navigation for land transportation. However, due to
the intended provision of the Galileo SoL service in the
coming years, it is expected that the Galileo system (or
Galileo together with GPS) will be implemented in
European railway safety-related systems rather than stand-
alone GPS. Current development in GNSS technology and
existing standards dedicated to safety applications clearly
show that main leader in this field is the aeronautical
community.
In this paper, we have, in particular, highlighted the
question of the safety assessment. Two main axes are
concerned. The first deals with the question of the RAMS
evaluation of the satellite-based location function delivered
to a railway application, as recommended by railway safety
standards. The second concerns the relation that can be
established between the Galileo specifications, mainly
expressed according to aeronautical needs, and the railway
RAMS attributes.
The railway community has discovered the great
potential of GNSS rather late. Nowadays, railways are no
longer in position whether to accept or not a „gift“ from the
aeronautical/GNSS industry in the form of the Galileo
system with its SoL service. But the question remains: how
to use this gift for railway safety applications according to
railway safety standards. Railway operators, infrastructure
authorities, railway industry, research institutions and other
railway actors support this concept. This paper can be
considered as a contribution to this effort.
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